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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE CNET NETWORKS, INC.  
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE  
LITIGATION

No. C 06-03817 WHA

**ORDER GRANTING NOMINAL  
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO  
DISMISS AND REQUESTING  
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING**

\_\_\_\_\_  
This Document Relates To:  
ALL ACTIONS

**INTRODUCTION**

In this shareholder derivative action, individual defendants and nominal defendant move to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended verified complaint. The complaint alleges claim under Section 10(b), Section 14(a), and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. As this action was brought as a derivative action, plaintiffs are required to make a demand on the board, or else plead with particularity that demand was futile. Plaintiffs have failed to plead with particularity that demand on the board was excused as futile under FRCP 23.1. Accordingly, nominal defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to plead demand futility is **GRANTED**. Because of this, this order does not address the merits of the individual defendants’ motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs and nominal defendant are requested to submit supplemental briefing a narrow discovery issue.



1 grant date. If the option's price is below the price on the market as of the grant date, the  
2 company has to recognize the difference between the two as a compensation expense. If the  
3 option's price is at or above the price on the market at the grant date, the company recognizes  
4 no compensation expense. For options backdated to a lower price, the proper accounting is to  
5 recognize an expense. This, of course, will lower or eliminate the company's earnings for the  
6 period of the backdated grants.

7 **2. CNET.**

8 On May 16, 2006, the Center Financial Research and Accountability published a report  
9 titled "Options Backdating — Which Companies Are at Risk?" The report identified certain  
10 companies that were at risk for having granted backdated stock options, including nominal  
11 defendant CNET (Herkenhoff Decl. Exh. A). In an effort to address the ensuing storm at  
12 CNET, its board of directors announced on May 22, 2006, that it had appointed a special  
13 committee of independent directors to investigate stock options granting practices (CNET Req.  
14 Jud. Not. Exh. A). On July 10, 2006, CNET announced that pursuant to the investigation, it  
15 would have to restate its financial statements for the years 2003, 2004, and 2005 (Compl. ¶ 5).  
16 Lawsuits, including this action, quickly followed.

17 By October 11, 2006, the internal investigation was completed culminating in the  
18 special committee report. The entire contents of the report were not released to the public.  
19 CNET issued a press release summarizing some of the special committee's findings. It stated  
20 that "[t]here were deficiencies with the process by which options were granted at CNET,  
21 including in some instances the backdating of option grants, during the period from the  
22 Company's IPO in 1996 through at least 2003." It also stated that "[t]he report does not  
23 conclude that any current employees of the Company or any recently resigned employees  
24 engaged in intentional wrongdoing" (CNET Req. Jud. Not. Exh. G). The entire report itself was  
25 circulated internally at CNET and was given to various agencies, including the SEC, the United  
26 States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California, and NASD. At the same time,  
27 CNET was facing delisting proceedings by the NASDAQ because of delays in its financial  
28 statements. Only a bullet-point summary of the report was included in the press release.

1 On December 26, 2006, CNET disclosed in a Form 8K filed with the SEC that some  
2 employees, including moving defendants Ashe, Briggs, Colligan, and Robison had entered into  
3 agreements amending the exercise price of stock options that may have been granted to them at  
4 below-market value to the extent those options had not yet vested (Singerman Decl. Exh. E).  
5 Additionally, Currie, Nelson, Mohn, Colligan and Robison allegedly entered into agreements  
6 with the company to repay the difference between the exercise price and the stock's price on the  
7 true date of the grant for options that had been exercised (*ibid.*).

8 CNET filed its restated financial statements with the SEC on January 29, 2007.  
9 Plaintiffs allege that CNET admitted in these statements to granting backdated stock options,  
10 while defendants state that the stock options were merely mispriced for accounting purposes  
11 and that no intentional wrongdoing took place. The restated financial statement said "we  
12 [CNET's management and the special committee] identified instances where the grant date used  
13 by us as the measurement date for accounting purposes, differed from the measurement date as  
14 defined in Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25 . . . for more than the grants identified  
15 in the CFRA report" (*id.* at Exh. F). The amended 10K described CNET's process in correcting  
16 grant dates, and the evidence on which it relied in doing so. As a result of the adjustments,  
17 CNET recognized an additional stock-compensation expense of \$105.7 million over the years  
18 from 1996 through 2005. CNET reiterated that the committee had found that no current or  
19 recently resigned employees or directors had engaged in any intentional wrongdoing (*ibid.*).

### 20 3. PARTIES.

21 Plaintiffs Martin Melzer and James L. Finn were (and remain) shareholders of nominal  
22 defendant CNET Networks, Inc., at all times relevant to this action (Compl. ¶ 23–24).

23 Defendants are current and former CNET directors and officers.

24 As to all individual defendants, plaintiffs allege that each of the directors helped prepare  
25 all financial statements and proxy statements for filing with the SEC during their respective  
26 tenures at CNET. Plaintiffs plead that each director "ratified" all allegedly backdated stock  
27 options granted during his or her time on the board. Each of the proxy statements and financial  
28 statements issued from 1998 until 2006 is alleged to contain misrepresentations as a result of

1 backdating and for the purpose of continuing the alleged backdating scheme. Plaintiffs make no  
2 allegations that any defendant exercised backdated options or sold stock acquired from those  
3 options. Plaintiffs also do not allege how they arrived at the value of plaintiffs' stock options or  
4 at what time the alleged value was measured.

5 The following individual defendants were members of CNET's board of directors at the  
6 time the complaint was filed on June 19, 2006.

7 Defendant Shelby Bonnie served on CNET's board of directors since 1993, as its CEO  
8 since March 2000, and as its chairman of the board since November 2000 (Compl. ¶ 27). He  
9 resigned from the company in October 2006, allegedly because of his role in the backdating  
10 scheme. Plaintiffs allege that he personally benefitted from receiving backdated stock options  
11 worth at least \$7.6 million. Bonnie allegedly sold over three million CNET shares, receiving  
12 proceeds of \$58.4 million. Plaintiffs do not allege that the shares Bonnie sold were those he  
13 acquired by exercising backdated options. They only plead that he sold shares based on  
14 material non-public information related to backdating at CNET.

15 Defendant John C. Colligan served as a director since 1996. Allegedly, he was a  
16 member of the compensation committee from 1999 until 2006, and served on the audit  
17 committee from 1997 until 2000 (Compl. ¶ 28). He is alleged to have received backdated stock  
18 options worth at least \$561,000.

19 Defendant Eric Robison began serving on the board of directors in December 1994. He  
20 was allegedly a member of the audit committee from 1997 until 2006, and a member of the  
21 compensation committee from 2002 through 2003. He is alleged to have received at least  
22 \$561,000 worth of backdated stock options (Compl. ¶ 32).

23 Defendant Jarl Mohn began serving on CNET's board of directors in December 2003.  
24 He served as a member of the compensation committee from 2004 to 2006, and as a member of  
25 the audit committee from 2005 to 2006. He is alleged to have received at least \$352,000 worth  
26 of backdated stock options (Compl. ¶ 30).

27 Defendant Elizabeth A. Nelson also joined CNET's board of directors in  
28 December 2003. She served on the audit committee from at least 2003 until 2006, and on the

1 finance committee from at least 2004 until 2006. Like Mohn, plaintiffs allege that she received  
2 backdated stock options worth at least \$352,000 (Compl. ¶ 31).

3 Defendant Peter L.S. Currie served as a CNET director since December 2005, and as a  
4 member of the audit committee since at least 2005. Plaintiffs did not allege that Currie received  
5 or personally benefitted from backdated stock options (Compl. ¶ 29).

6 The following defendants are current executives of CNET and have never served on the  
7 board of directors.

8 Defendant Barry D. Briggs was president of CNET Media from October 2000 until at  
9 least 2004. He has been CNET's president and COO since 2005. Briggs allegedly received  
10 backdated stock options worth at least \$7.5 million (Compl. ¶ 39).

11 Defendant Neil M. Ashe became CNET's executive vice president in 2005. Prior to  
12 that, he served as senior vice president of CNET Media from May 2002 until at least late in  
13 2004. Plaintiffs allege that Ashe received at least \$934,000 worth of backdated stock options  
14 and sold stock worth \$470,300 based on material, non-public information (Compl. ¶ 38).  
15 Plaintiffs do not allege that Ashe exercised the options.

16 Defendant George E. Mazzotta has been the company's CFO since July 2005. Plaintiffs  
17 allege that he authorized the misreporting of backdated stock options and helped prepare and  
18 sign financial statements to that effect. There are no allegations that Mazzotta received  
19 backdated stock options (Compl. ¶ 37).

20 The following defendants were former directors and executives of CNET.

21 Defendant Halsey Minor co-founded CNET in 1992 and served the company as  
22 chairman of the board, president and CEO from the company's inception until March 2000  
23 (Compl. ¶ 26). He is also alleged to have received backdated stock options worth at least  
24 \$9.6 million and sold at least two million shares of CNET stock, receiving proceeds of at least  
25 \$72 million. Plaintiffs do not allege that Minor exercised backdated options.

26 Defendant Mitchell E. Kertzman was a member of CNET's board of directors from 1996  
27 until at least 2003. He served on the compensation committee from 1997 to 2000 and in 2003,  
28 and on the audit committee from 2001 through 2003. He is not alleged to have received any

1 backdated stock options. Plaintiffs do allege, however, that he sold CNET stock for proceeds of  
2 at least \$3.4 million based on material, non-public information related to undisclosed  
3 backdating (Compl. ¶35).

4 Defendant Douglas N. Woodrum served on CNET's board of directors from 1997 until  
5 October 2000. He was also an executive vice president and CFO from December 1997 until  
6 October 2004. Plaintiffs allege that Woodrum received backdated stock options worth at least  
7 \$3.4 million (Compl. ¶ 36). There are no allegations that defendant exercised these options.

8 Defendant Richard J. Marino was a president of CNET from April 1999 until March  
9 2001. Marino allegedly received at least \$29.5 million worth of backdated stock options from  
10 CNET (Compl. ¶ 40).

11 Defendant Eric Hippeau served as a CNET director from October 2000 through  
12 December 2003. He was a member of the compensation committee while he served as a  
13 director. Plaintiffs did not allege that Hippeau received backdated options, but they did allege  
14 that he sold CNET stock for proceeds of at least \$5 million based on material, non-public  
15 information (Compl. ¶ 34).

16 Defendant Art Fatum was CNET's president of international media from October 2000  
17 until at least July 2002. Thereafter, he served as CNET's COO until August 2003. Plaintiffs  
18 allege that he received backdated stock options worth at least \$307,800.

19 Defendant Daniel Rosensweig was CNET's president and a director from October 2002  
20 to April 2002. Plaintiffs allege that Rosensweig received stock options worth at least  
21 \$14 million (Compl. ¶ 33). Plaintiffs do not allege that Rosensweig sold any stock or exercised  
22 any of these options.

#### 23 **4. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.**

24 The first complaint in this action was filed on June 19, 2006, alleging both securities and  
25 state-law claims. An order issued on August 31, 2006, consolidating Melzer's and Finn's  
26 actions and appointing them co-lead plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint on  
27 September 28, 2006. The Court set a schedule for briefing and hearing defendants' motions to  
28 dismiss. Defendants filed motions on October 26, 2006, as well as a motion to stay discovery

1 pending their outcome. Instead of filing an opposition, plaintiffs filed a first amended  
2 complaint. It omitted the state-law claims and only alleged violations of the federal securities  
3 laws and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Defendants' motion to stay discovery was granted thereafter.  
4 Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production of the special committee's report which was  
5 denied.

6 The extant, second amended verified consolidated complaint was filed on February 22,  
7 2007, after CNET had filed its restated financial statements with the SEC. The final version of  
8 the complaint alleges four derivative claims. It alleges violations of Section 10(b), Section  
9 14(a), and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934, as well as a claim for disgorgement of  
10 incentive-based compensation under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. A total of  
11 six motions to dismiss were filed, including motions by groups of individual defendants as well  
12 as on behalf of nominal defendant CNET. A hearing was held on April 5, 2007.

### 13 ANALYSIS

14 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged  
15 in the complaint. A complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the  
16 plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."  
17 *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). However, "conclusory allegations of law and  
18 unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a  
19 claim." *Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co.*, 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996).

20 In arguing these many motions to dismiss, defendants and nominal defendant ask the  
21 Court to take judicial notice of the full text of a number of SEC filings and public documents  
22 which are referenced in the complaint. On considering a motion to dismiss, judicial notice of  
23 the full text of documents referenced in a complaint is proper under the doctrine of  
24 incorporation by reference. *No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v.*  
25 *Am. W. Holding Corp.*, 320 F.3d 920, 925 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). For other publicly filed  
26 documents, "[a] court may take judicial notice of public filings when adjudicating a motion to  
27 dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." *In re Calpine*  
28 *Sec. Litig*, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2003). Accordingly, documents referenced in

1 plaintiffs' complaint and CNET's public filings are the proper subjects of judicial notice and  
2 will be considered in the disposition of these motions.

3 **1. LEGAL STANDARD FOR DEMAND FUTILITY.**

4 Nominal defendant CNET moves to dismiss the derivative complaint for failure to make  
5 a demand on the board. A shareholder bringing a derivative action must "allege with  
6 particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires  
7 from the directors or comparable authority . . . and the reasons for plaintiff's failure to obtain  
8 the action or for not making the effort." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1. "A shareholder seeking to  
9 vindicate the interests of a corporation through a derivative suit must first demand action from  
10 the corporation's directors or plead with particularity the reasons why such demand would have  
11 been futile." *In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 183 F.3d 970, 989 (9th Cir. 1999). "A trial  
12 court need not blindly accept as true all allegations, nor must it draw all inferences from them in  
13 plaintiffs' favor unless they are reasonable inferences." *Grobow v. Perot*, 539 A.2d 180, 187  
14 (Del. 1988). Here, plaintiffs do not allege that they made a demand. They instead plead that  
15 doing so would have been futile. "[A] court that is entertaining a derivative action . . . must  
16 apply the demand futility exception as it is defined by the law of the state of incorporation."  
17 *Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc.*, 500 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1991). CNET was incorporated in  
18 Delaware, so Delaware law applies on this point.

19 Two tests for demand futility are applied under Delaware law. If a derivative suit  
20 challenges a decision made by a board of directors, then plaintiffs are excused from making a  
21 demand if "under the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that (1) the  
22 directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the  
23 product of a valid exercise of business judgment." *Aronson v. Lewis*, 473 A.2d 805, 814  
24 (Del. 1984). A different test applies where the directors did *not* make a decision. "[A] court  
25 must determine whether or not the particularized factual allegations of a derivative stockholder  
26 complaint create a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint is filed, the board of  
27 directors could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in  
28 responding to a demand." *Rales v. Blasband*, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993). To prove that

1 demand would have been futile, the plaintiff must show that a majority of directors were not  
2 independent or disinterested, *i.e.*, if three directors on a six-member board were not independent  
3 or disinterested, demand would be excused. *Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia,*  
4 *Inc. v. Stewart*, 845 A.2d 1040, 1046 (Del. 2004).

5 In their complaint, plaintiffs refer both to the board member's "actions and conscious  
6 failure to act" (Compl. ¶ 205). Most of plaintiffs' allegations, however, refer to the board's  
7 actions, such as ratifying option grants, preparing and signing proxy statements and financial  
8 statements, and financially benefitting from backdated options. Accordingly, the *Aronson* test  
9 for demand futility applies. Plaintiffs argue that demand would have been futile under several  
10 theories. *First*, demand would be futile because each of the six CNET board members as of the  
11 time of the complaint, Bonnie, Colligan, Currie, Mohn, Nelson and Robison, all had received  
12 backdated options. *Second*, plaintiffs allege that each of these directors "ratified" the grants of  
13 backdated options. *Third*, plaintiffs allege that demand would have been futile because Mohn,  
14 Robison and Colligan were on the compensation committee, and as such they were responsible  
15 for granting options under the options plans. *Finally*, plaintiffs also allege that those three  
16 directors would face a substantial likelihood of personal liability for the backdated options.  
17 Plaintiffs, however, have failed to plead with particularity facts that would raise a reasonable  
18 doubt that any three of the directors on the board as of the time of the complaint were not  
19 disinterested or independent, or that their decisions were not the product of business judgment.  
20 Accordingly, nominal defendant's motion is **GRANTED**, plaintiffs' complaint is **DISMISSED**.

## 21 2. ACCOUNTING AND ANALYTICAL METHODS.

22 Plaintiffs allege that demand was futile because all board members received backdated  
23 options. Nominal defendant CNET contends that there was no intentional wrongdoing in its  
24 options-granting practices. Any backdated options were merely the product of accounting  
25 errors, not illegal activity, it says. This order now examines both defendants' arguments based  
26 on accounting practices and plaintiffs' methodology for determining whether grants were  
27 backdated.  
28

1                   **A.     APB 25 and Accounting Practices.**

2           At all times relevant to this action, the reporting of expenses associated with stock  
3 options was governed by Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25, “Accounting for Stock  
4 Issued to Employees.” APB 25 recognized two kinds of options. If the option had an exercise  
5 price lower than the fair market value of the stock as of the “measurement date,” the company  
6 would have to recognize a compensation expense for the option over the period of time the  
7 employee performed services for the company. The expense would be equal to the difference  
8 between fair market value as of the grant date and the exercise price. APB 25 §§ 12–14. As  
9 stated, such grants are referred to as “in-the-money.” If the grants’ exercise price was equal to  
10 the fair market value of stock on the measurement date, the company would not have to  
11 recognize a compensation expense. Such grants are referred to as “at-the-money.”

12           Critical to this rule, and to this action, is the option’s “measurement date.” This term  
13 refers to the date on which the fair market value of option is determined. The measurement date  
14 is the first date on which are known both (1) the number of options that an individual employee  
15 is entitled to receive, and (2) the option or purchase price. APB 25.10(b). Frequently, the  
16 measurement date is the date the option is granted to the employee. A slightly more  
17 complicated situation arises when the grant is conditioned on some event occurring after the  
18 decision is made to grant the options. For instance, a grant could be made to an employee on  
19 joining the company, on taking on new responsibilities, or on taking on a new position within  
20 the company. In these instances, the number of shares and the purchase may be known before  
21 the condition is fulfilled. The measurement date, however, is not set until the condition  
22 happens.

23           The Chief Accountant’s Office of the SEC has identified a few instances where a  
24 company could use the wrong measurement date through sloppy accounting practices not rising  
25 to the level of fraud (CNET Req. Jud. Not. Exh. E). Oral approvals of options are arguably one  
26 such instance. Even though the terms of the option, that is, the number of shares, the recipient  
27 and the exercise price, are known on a certain date, all administrative actions may not have yet  
28 been taken to make the terms of the option final. In such situations, however, the facts and

1 circumstances surrounding the option grants can arguably establish that the terms of the grant  
2 were final on an earlier date. Some companies' stock options plans do not require that all  
3 administrative actions be completed before granting the options. Since APB 25 judges the  
4 measurement date from the date that both facts were known, the measurement date in such  
5 situations should be the earlier date, not the date on which all administrative actions were  
6 completed (CNET Req. Jud. Not. Exh. E at Section B).

7 A common practice, particularly in the high-technology sector, is to give an employee or  
8 director stock options on commencing employment. The amount and exercise price of the  
9 options to be given to the employee may be known before they actually begin work.  
10 Commencing work, however, is a condition precedent to the option grant. According to the  
11 Chief Accountant's Office, the measurement date should be only after the employee begins  
12 service with the company. This view makes sense because, until the employee actually starts  
13 work or fulfills the condition, the recipient and amount of options are not truly known. For  
14 example, the employee may still back out at the last moment, in which event the options would  
15 never be granted.

16 Another issue arises where the board is given discretion to allocate a certain number of  
17 options to its employees. Here, the overall number of options to be granted may be known well  
18 in advance of the exact recipients and their respective numbers of options. The recipients and  
19 numbers may be subject to change, or subject to the board's approval. Under APB 25,  
20 however, that information is not known until the grants are finalized and approved by the board.  
21 A twist on this scenario is where the board delegates authority to a subset of itself, or to other  
22 employees, to decide who receives the grants, in what amount, and on what dates. Again, the  
23 amounts, recipients, and prices are not known for certain until the board approves the options.  
24 The measurement date cannot occur until the options are approved by those with authority to do  
25 so.

26 The common thread to all of these scenarios is that determining the correct measurement  
27 date depends on the facts. This dependence can admit the possibility of innocent error — using  
28 an incorrect measurement date to price the options with no intent to find an advantageously low

1 price. Intentionally employing hindsight to adjust the grant date to an advantageously low  
2 price, or “backdating,” is fraud. Backdating is done to avoid recognizing compensation  
3 expenses. Yet grantees get options that start out in-the-money which enriches them by that  
4 amount. This is particularly pernicious where options are granted as incentive-based  
5 compensation. The employee gets the incentive without doing anything to increase the  
6 company’s value.

7 **B. Plaintiffs’ Methodology in Alleging Backdated Stock Options.**

8 We are at the pleading stage. The issue is whether plaintiffs have alleged circumstances  
9 from which we may reasonably infer backdating as opposed to innocent bookkeeping error. As  
10 is often the case, direct evidence of intent is rare and difficult to uncover. Plaintiffs argue that  
11 illegal backdating, and not mere accounting errors, can be inferred from the fact that so many of  
12 the options’ grant dates were at or near historic lows in a certain period. The odds of this  
13 occurring from innocent error, they urge, are so slim as to exclude innocent error as a practical  
14 possibility.

15 Backdating has been widely studied by various methods since news of the practice first  
16 came to light. On March 18, 2006, an article appeared in the *Wall Street Journal* that detailed  
17 suspicious options grants to directors and officers in some companies. Forelle and Bandler,  
18 “The Perfect Payday,” *Wall St. J.*, Mar. 18, 2006, at A1. It noted that generally, a pattern of  
19 sharp stock-price appreciation after grant dates is a fairly clear signal that the dates were not  
20 selected by chance, that fraud may have occurred. If the grant dates were selected at random,  
21 performance after grant dates should be more or less random as well. To find such a pattern,  
22 some analysts looked at the twenty trading days after the grant was made and calculated how  
23 much each company’s stock appreciated in that period. The stock appreciation in the twenty  
24 trading days following the grant date was ranked against the appreciation in the same period  
25 measured from each trading day in the year. Companies with consistently highly ranked grant  
26 dates were considered to be at risk for having granted backdated options. The *Wall Street*  
27 *Journal’s* study did not look at CNET.  
28

1 The Center for Financial Research and Analysis conducted its own study on backdating.  
2 Its report, issued on May 16, 2006, identified a number of companies that were at risk for  
3 having granted backdated stock options, CNET included. Its method was to first identify firms  
4 that used a high amount of stock-based compensation. Next, it individually analyzed those  
5 firms' stock options grants, looking for any options where the price on the grant date was within  
6 105% of the ten-day or forty-day periodic low point in stock price and where the price range  
7 within that period was more than ten percent of the lowest stock price. Grants that met the  
8 criteria were flagged. The report compared each firms' number of flagged grants to the total  
9 number of grants from 1998 through mid-2002. Companies with more than three flagged grants  
10 were considered to be at risk for having granted backdated options. The report went to great  
11 pains to state that it was only assessing risk, not determining whether backdating actually took  
12 place (Herkenhoff Decl. Exh. A at 3).

13 The CFRA report identified four flagged grants at CNET that were dated June 3, 1998,  
14 April 17, 2000, October 18, 2000, and October 8, 2001 (*id.* at 7). Each of them was granted at  
15 or near a periodic low in the stock price, followed by a sharp increase. Of these four grants,  
16 however, plaintiffs here only plead facts that the grant on October 18, 2000, was backdated.

17 Plaintiffs state that their "analysis [of the options] follows in the footsteps of the  
18 widely-accepted analytical model used by *The Wall Street Journal* and the CFRA to reveal the  
19 nationwide backdating scandal" (Opp. at 9). Similarly, in the complaint plaintiffs pleaded that  
20 they "employ[ed] a widely accepted analytical model for detecting backdated options — the  
21 price action of an issuer's common stock twenty days before and twenty days after the date of  
22 grant" (Compl. ¶ 60). It seems, however, that plaintiffs only followed those footsteps halfway.  
23 For instance, after looking at the twenty days after the grant date, the *Wall Street Journal's*  
24 study ranked the returns in that period against all other possible grant dates within the year to  
25 establish how unusual, versus the rest of the stock's behavior, the activity following the grant  
26 date was. The CFRA study compared the number of at-risk grants to the total number of grants.  
27 Plaintiffs made no such comparisons. They barely used an analytical model at all. They merely  
28 looked at the stock price movement. Implying otherwise is disingenuous.

1 They say that their method is “widely accepted.” They fail to plead where their method  
2 came from, whether it was used by anyone else, or whether it was peer-reviewed or bore other  
3 indicia of academic approval. This is not to say that the Court would necessarily require  
4 plaintiffs to perform a complex financial analysis at the pleading stage. Nor to say that the  
5 CFRA’s and the *Wall Street Journal*’s methods are the only valid methods. Sound analytical  
6 methods are one way that plaintiffs could have eliminated the possibility that the returns from  
7 the grants were the product of dumb luck. Without them, that inference is more difficult to  
8 support.

9 **3. BACKDATING AND CNET.**

10 Plaintiffs allege that demand would have been futile because each of the directors either  
11 participated in the scheme or received backdated options themselves. A director would be  
12 interested if he or she knowingly received backdated stock options. A director is considered  
13 interested if he or she is on both sides of a transaction, that is, the director is engaging in  
14 self-dealing. *Aronson*, 473 A.2d at 812. Furthermore, “a director is interested when he or she  
15 will receive a personal financial benefit from a transaction that is not equally shared by the  
16 stockholders.” *Rales*, 634 A.2d at 936. If a corporate decision will have a detrimental impact  
17 on the director, but not the corporation or its stockholders, a director can be considered  
18 interested. *Ibid*. If a director received backdated stock options, he or she would be receiving a  
19 benefit not shared by the shareholders. When purchasing the company’s stock, the shareholders  
20 did not have the benefit of reaching back in time to buy their shares at low-price point. A  
21 decision to correct the grants would have a detrimental impact on the directors by removing a  
22 financial benefit they received. Since backdating is a form of fraud, the directors could be  
23 subject to a substantial likelihood of personal liability. Accordingly, if plaintiffs can plead with  
24 particularity that the directors received backdated grants, those directors will be considered  
25 interested.

26 In *Ryan v. Gifford*, \_\_\_ A.2d \_\_\_, 2007 WL 1018208, \*8–\*9 (Del. Ch. Feb 6, 2007), a  
27 Delaware court held that knowing approval of backdated option grants, along with intentional  
28 failure to disclose them, would render demand futile. In pleading that demand was futile, the

1 court held that plaintiffs had pleaded particularized facts that if true, could show the grants to be  
2 backdated. The *Ryan* plaintiffs relied heavily on a report prepared by Merrill Lynch that did an  
3 empirical analysis comparing the annualized returns from the reported grant dates versus the  
4 annualized returns for the stock itself. The reported grant dates yielded a return higher than the  
5 stock's annualized return by a factor of ten. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that stock  
6 options were not granted pursuant to an overall plan; options were granted sporadically.  
7 Because such facts were pleaded with particularity, the Delaware court held that for purposes of  
8 demand futility, the options were backdated.

9 Judge Maxine Chesney of our own district, however, held that merely alleging that  
10 options were granted at a periodic low in stock price that was followed by a sharp jump in price  
11 was not sufficient to plead a pattern of backdating. More facts, including how often and at what  
12 times past stock options were granted, were needed to show a pattern. *In re Linear Tech. Corp.*  
13 *Deriv. Litig.*, 2006 WL 3533024 at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2006) (Chesney, J). Much like the  
14 plaintiffs in *Linear Tech.*, plaintiffs here rely on pointing out instances where options were  
15 granted at a periodic low point in stock price, followed by an increase. They do not plead any  
16 facts as to when any other options were granted, or under what circumstances they were  
17 granted. Nor do they plead any particularized facts regarding the board's role in granting the  
18 options. In response, nominal defendant presents facts in the documents on which plaintiffs  
19 rely to show that at least some of the grants were made pursuant to an overall plan and thus  
20 could not have been backdated.

21 **A. The Eight Alleged Grants.**

22 The eight grants occurred between 1998 and 2003. Here, this order analyzes each grant.

23 **(1) June 3, 1998.**

24 On this date, plaintiffs allege, a split-adjusted grant of 1.2 million shares of stock was  
25 given to CNET's then-chairman Minor. The stock's price rose 115.1% in the twenty trading  
26 days following the grant, nearly doubling the grant's value (Compl. ¶¶ 63–64). Defendants  
27 contend that this grant was made to Minor for taking on additional duties as CEO of Snap!, a  
28 joint venture with NBC. A press release to that effect was issued on June 9, 1998, and a copy

1 was included in CNET's Form 8K filed shortly thereafter (CNET Req. Jud. Not. Exh. BB).  
2 The press release announcing Minor's new duties came several days *after* the stated date of the  
3 grant. If the grant date and the press release were contemporaneous in time, that could negate  
4 the near-doubling in the stock price. This was not the case. Given the twofold increase in stock  
5 price and the lapse of time between the grant date and the press release, plaintiff has pleaded  
6 facts that support the inference that this grant was backdated.

7 **(2) May 25, 1999.**

8 Allegedly, an option grant of 448,006 shares was made to Marino on this date.  
9 Twenty trading days later, the stock price had gone up by 7.2% (Compl. ¶ 65). Defendants  
10 contend that this grant was made in connection with Marino's starting work at CNET. In  
11 support of this, they present the offer letter to Marino, which was filed as an attachment to a  
12 quarterly report filed with the SEC. Plaintiffs' complaint references all financial statements  
13 filed by CNET with the SEC between the years of 1998 and 2006. Thus, the contents of this  
14 document are appropriate for judicial notice. It listed his start date as May 24, 1999 (CNET  
15 Req. Jud. Not. Exh. Y). The grant date was the next day after that, May 25, 1999; however, this  
16 severely undercuts the contention that this date was chosen at some time after the fact. Indeed,  
17 under APB 25, since Marino's beginning employment was a condition of the grant, May 24,  
18 1999, was the earliest possible measurement date. At most, the measurement date was off by a  
19 single day.

20 Defendants also point out that the stock dropped precipitously after the grant date.  
21 Marino never actually exercised the option because it was never in the money. This grant,  
22 however, was tied to an event at the company and was not selected randomly. Plaintiffs merely  
23 alleged that there was a runup in stock price after the grant date. The measurement date, at  
24 most, was wrong by a single day. Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled facts supporting an  
25 inference that the grant was backdated.

26 **(3) April 17, 2000.**

27 This grant was allegedly made to Bonnie, Marino and Woodrum, with the executives  
28 receiving 200,000, 200,000 and 125,000 options respectively. On the date of the grant, the

1 stock was trading below its average for the year. Twenty trading days later, the stock showed a  
2 66.2% increase in price (Compl. ¶ 66). Defendants point out that these options were never  
3 exercised because the stock price fell shortly thereafter. Defendants also contend that if this  
4 was a scheme to enrich directors, then clearly someone picked the wrong grant date. This  
5 argument carries little weight. The grant date could have been changed before the stock fell.  
6 The directors and officers may have thought that the stock price would keep rising thereafter, so  
7 they went with the lowest price they could find in a certain period. Plaintiffs have successfully  
8 pleaded that this grant was backdated. It was not selected as part of an overall plan, and the  
9 sharp increase in stock price afterward is sufficient to eliminate the possibility that the grant  
10 date was the product of blind luck.

11 **(4) June 30, 2000.**

12 On this grant date, 60,000 options were granted to Colligan, Robison and Kertzman.  
13 Colligan and Robison are current directors. As with the grant dated April 17, 2000, the stock  
14 was trading below its annual average. The stock showed a 35.6% increase in price over the  
15 next twenty trading days (Compl. ¶ 67). CNET argues that this option grant could not possibly  
16 have been backdated. The date had been selected as part of the existing stock options plan, as  
17 detailed in the proxy statements for the years 1998 and 1999, incorporated into plaintiffs'  
18 complaint by reference. Directors, such as Colligan, Robison and Kertzmman, would be given  
19 options grants on June 30 of each year. This practice was first disclosed in 1998 and was  
20 continued through 2000 (CNET Req. Jud. Not. Exhs. N, O). The grant date for these options  
21 was selected three years in advance and disclosed in publicly-filed statements. Because the  
22 option was granted pursuant to an overall plan, and the facts alleged fit into the pattern of that  
23 plan, plaintiffs' allegations do not show backdating.

24 **(5) October 18, 2000.**

25 Plaintiffs allege that 1.15 million options were granted to executives Rosensweig, Briggs  
26 and Marino. The stock was trading at considerably less than the annual average, and was at its  
27 lowest price in the month. The stock price showed an increase of 38.7% over the exercise price  
28 within the twenty trading days following the grant (Compl. ¶ 68). Defendants argue that this

1 was a welcome grant given to new employees on the completion of a merger with another  
2 internet-media company, ZDNet. The acquisition was announced on October 17, 2000, and was  
3 described in financial statements filed with the SEC shortly thereafter. Furthermore, October  
4 18 was the day on which Rosensweig, Briggs and Marino became employees of CNET (CNET  
5 Req. Jud. Not. Exh. CC). Non-employees cannot receive options under any option plans.  
6 October 18, 2000, was the first date on which the grant's price could have been measured.

7 Defendants concede that the run up in the stock price after the grant was quite striking.  
8 They point out, however, that the grant came on the heels of very good news: CNET had just  
9 acquired ZDNet, its largest rival. Furthermore, the three recipients never exercised any of the  
10 options because by the time the options had vested, the stock price had fallen back to earth and  
11 the options were underwater. The law, however, may punish even the unsuccessful fraudster, or  
12 at least the incident could be used to establish an overall pattern. This particular grant was  
13 made upon the occurrence of an event in the company and was made pursuant to an overall  
14 plan. Rosensweig, Briggs and Marino had just joined the company pursuant to the merger, so  
15 they were given options. Mere reliance on the numbers is not sufficient when plaintiffs are  
16 confronted with a legitimate, judicially-noticeable explanation for the grant date. To plead with  
17 particularity that this grant was backdated, plaintiffs would need to allege specific facts showing  
18 that this was not the true grant date. Here, they have not done so.

19 **(6) *October 8, 2001.***

20 Bonnie, Briggs, Fatum, Rosensweig and Woodrum allegedly received a grant of 1.2  
21 million options on October 8, 2001. As with other grants, the exercise price was considerably  
22 lower than the yearly average price. The stock rose in the twenty trading days following the  
23 grant date, yielding a cumulative return of 49.7% over that time. The exercise price was the  
24 third lowest price for that month (Compl. ¶ 69). Defendants argue that if this grant was part of  
25 some massive scheme to enrich the grantees, why not go for the lowest price they could find?  
26 This argument is like giving a bank robber credit for leaving some cash in the vault. Perhaps  
27 they did not want to make it too obvious by being too greedy. The simple fact that there were  
28 days close in time where the stock closed at an even lower price is not sufficient to defeat the

1 facts pleaded by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have successfully pleaded that this grant may have been  
2 backdated. This grant was not made pursuant to some overall plan, and the numbers  
3 surrounding it give rise to an inference that the date was changed.

4 (7) *June 24, 2003.*

5 On June 24, 2003, directors Colligan and Robison and four other CNET executives  
6 allegedly received a total of 930,000 options on this date. Again, the stock was trading below  
7 the annual average, and twenty trading days later, the stock had risen by 23.3% (Compl. ¶ 70).  
8 Defendants point out that CNET manually filed Form 4 statements reporting these grants to the  
9 SEC two days later on June 26, 2003 (CNET Req. Jud. Not. Exhs. W, X, Z, L, K). Under the  
10 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, all directors and officers transacting in their company's stock  
11 were required to file a Form 4 by the close of business on the second day following the  
12 transaction. 15 U.S.C. 78p(a)(2)(C).

13 As this law was enacted, backdating became more difficult to pull off. Options grants  
14 had to be recorded with the SEC within two days of the grant date. This severely curtailed the  
15 ability to go back in time and change the grant date. Here, Colligan and Robison complied with  
16 the filing requirements, and plaintiffs make no allegations that the Form 4 were false; again,  
17 plaintiffs merely rely on the numbers.

18 It is highly unlikely that defendants could have gone back in time to change the date for  
19 this grant if it was on record with the SEC two days after the fact. Defendants would not have  
20 had time to see what the stock did in the next few days in order to find the most advantageous  
21 grant date. This does cast doubt on plaintiffs' allegations. It is possible that as part of the  
22 scheme, CNET had adopted a "wait-and-see" approach toward the timing of options trying to  
23 spot periodic low points. Still, the executives and directors simply could not have known  
24 precisely what the stock would do in the coming days. The ability to go back and change the  
25 date to a more fortuitous time is essentially the guts of any backdating scheme. Here, plaintiffs  
26 have failed to plead facts that this grant and the accompanying returns could not have merely  
27 been the product of chance.  
28

1 (8) *December 10, 2003.*

2 Current directors Mohn and Nelson allegedly received a total of 110,000 options on this  
3 date. These options showed a twenty-day cumulative return over the exercise price of 33%  
4 (Compl. ¶ 71). This grant was made to Mohn and Nelson on their joining CNET's board. The  
5 grant date was originally set for December 10, 2003, the date that Mohn and Nelson joined the  
6 board. Two days later, on December 12, 2003, Mohn and Nelson electronically filed Form 4s  
7 with the SEC disclosing the options (CNET Req. Jud. Not. Exhs I, H). As with the grant dated  
8 June 24, 2003, the recipients were obligated to file a Form 4 with the SEC within two days of  
9 the transaction, however, as of July 2003, this had to be done electronically. 15 U.S.C.  
10 78p(a)(4). CNET's restated financial statements explained that Mohn and Nelson actually  
11 attended their first board meeting the next day, on December 11, 2003, the day after the grant  
12 date. CNET decided that the grant date should have been the date that Mohn and Nelson  
13 attended their first board meeting, instead of the date that they "joined the board." According to  
14 CNET, this option, if at all, had been "backdated" by a single day, and only because of  
15 confusion over when Nelson and Mohn's board service actually began (Req. Jud. Not. Exh. Q at  
16 99). Nelson did exercise some of these options, although plaintiffs did not allege this in their  
17 complaint (*id.* at Exh. I). The options were later repriced to fair market value on the true grant  
18 date, December 11, 2003 (*id.* at Exh. Q at 99). Nelson repaid the difference to the company.

19 Against this is the fact that the original grant date of December 10, 2003, did come at the  
20 lowest point within a certain period of time. The stock rose by nearly a dollar per share on the  
21 next day, perhaps because of the news that new directors were joining the board, or for any  
22 number of other reasons. Again, plaintiffs rely solely on the numbers in pleading that this grant  
23 was backdated. They plead no other facts in support. Defendants admitted that the grant date  
24 was wrong by one day, but that is all. Plaintiffs have not met their burden to plead with  
25 particularity that this grant was illegally backdated.

26 To summarize, plaintiffs have successfully pleaded that the grants on June 3, 1998,  
27 April 17, 2000, and October 8, 2001, were backdated. This means that plaintiffs have pleaded  
28 that Bonnie, Briggs, Fatum, Marino, Minor, Woodrum and Rosensweig received backdated

1 options. Of these, only Bonnie was on the board at the time the complaint was filed; the  
2 remainder are former board members or executives.

3 Defendants counter by contending that although Bonnie owned and sold large amounts  
4 of CNET stock, he never exercised any of the particular options plaintiffs accuse of having been  
5 backdated. The Form 4s filings with the SEC reflect this (CNET Req. Jud. Not. Exh. W).  
6 Because of this, he did not actually receive any benefit not shared with the rest of the  
7 stockholders. The fact remains, however, that such benefit was available to him, depending on  
8 the movement of the stock price in the future. He stood to lose this benefit if the options were  
9 investigated.

10 Defendants also argue that plaintiffs have not pleaded facts that indicate that the  
11 potential benefit to directors receiving backdated grants was material. Plaintiffs did not explain  
12 in the pleadings how they calculated the value of Bonnie's stock options. They merely alleged  
13 a figure of \$7.6 million. By receiving backdated options, Bonnie still has a chance of being  
14 subject to personal liability despite plaintiffs' sloppy pleading. Plaintiffs have pleaded facts that  
15 give rise to a reasonable doubt that Bonnie was disinterested.

16 **B. CNET's Restated Financial Statements.**

17 To allege that options were backdated, plaintiffs finally argue that defendants admitted  
18 to issuing and receiving backdated options in the amended 10K filed on January 29, 2007, and  
19 by repricing options that some directors and employees had received as detailed in CNET's 8K  
20 filed on December 26, 2006. Defendants have conceded that some options given to CNET's  
21 directors and executives were repriced to reflect the outcome of the special committee's  
22 investigation. It seems that plaintiffs would have the Court infer, from this alone, that each  
23 instance was an admission of fraud by CNET. Plaintiffs would also have the Court ignore that  
24 the special committee concluded that there was no wrongdoing by any current or recently  
25 resigned directors or officers. In view of this statement, the inference that fraud still occurred  
26 despite an investigation and the eventual public release of results is improper absent other facts  
27 indicating fraud. Had plaintiffs pled other facts in support of this theory, perhaps such an  
28 inference would have been proper. Here, it is not. Plaintiffs have not pleaded with particularity

1 that the contents of the restated financial statements are untrue. Accordingly, plaintiffs may not  
2 rely on them as an automatic admission of fraud.

3 **4. BOARD MEMBERS' ACTIONS.**

4 The order now turns to the actions CNET's board members took with respect to granting  
5 stock options. First, plaintiffs allege that as board members, individual defendants ratified the  
6 grant of backdated options or, in the alternative, that ratifying the grant of backdated options  
7 could not have been the product of a valid exercise of business judgment. Mere membership on  
8 a committee or board, without specific allegations as to defendants' roles and conduct, is  
9 insufficient to support a finding that directors were conflicted. *In re Sagent Tech. Inc. Deriv.*  
10 *Litig.*, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1093–94 (N.D. Cal. 2003). As a Delaware court recently noted in  
11 another backdating case, however, it is difficult to imagine that someone acting as a loyal  
12 fiduciary with a responsibility to properly administer a company's shareholder-approved stock  
13 options plan would deliberately misrepresent that the board was fulfilling its obligations. *Ryan*  
14 *v. Gifford*, \_\_\_ A.2d \_\_\_, 2007 WL 1018208 at \*12. Much of the holding in *Ryan*, however,  
15 rested on the plaintiffs' having pleaded facts that led to the inference that the board of directors  
16 had ignored the company's stock options plans and had exceeded their authority by granting  
17 options that were not at fair market value. The pleadings in *Ryan* went beyond mere allegations  
18 of membership on the board.

19 **A. "Ratification" of Allegedly Backdated Grants.**

20 Here, plaintiffs have alleged that all of the current director-defendants "ratified"  
21 backdated stock grants to various people (Compl. ¶¶ 210–216). Currie, however, joined the  
22 board in December 2005. The latest backdated grant that plaintiffs even attempt to plead with  
23 particularity occurred on December 10, 2003, a full two years before Currie joined the board.  
24 He could not have voted on any of the allegedly backdated grants. Plaintiffs do not plead that  
25 Currie approved of or received backdated options, they only allege that he "ratified" the grants  
26 and the false statements that accompanied them. It is very unclear as to what plaintiffs mean by  
27 ratifying the grants — it could be post hoc approval, willingness to participate in a coverup, or  
28

1 knowing that the grants were backdated, or any number of transgressions. Plaintiffs go into no  
2 further detail in their allegations.

3 Furthermore, under Delaware law, “[a] member of the board of directors . . . shall, in the  
4 performance of such member’s duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the  
5 records of the corporation, and in good faith upon such information, opinions, reports or  
6 statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation’s officers or employees, or  
7 committees of the board of directors . . . .” Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2007). Under this  
8 section, Currie and other board members are allowed to rely on CNET’s records in good faith.  
9 Unless Currie had reason to know that CNET’s prior statements were false, he could rely on  
10 them. Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts that would indicate that such reliance was not in good  
11 faith. They only plead that backdating happened at some time, therefore, all of the directors at  
12 all times in a ten-year period must have known about it. This simply does not meet the standard  
13 for pleading facts with particularity that Currie knew or should have known of the alleged  
14 backdated options.

15 Furthermore, once the problems with the options came to light in the press, the board did  
16 take steps to rectify the situation. They engaged outside auditors and attorneys, did an  
17 investigation, and as a result repriced some options and restated their financial statements.  
18 Plaintiffs have not pleaded with particularity any facts that would raise a reasonable doubt as to  
19 Currie’s independence.

20 Defendants present similar arguments for defendants Mohn and Nelson, both of whom  
21 joined the board in December of 2003. They were recipients of the final allegedly backdated  
22 grants for which plaintiffs have failed to plead particularized facts that those grants were  
23 actually backdated. Assuming, *arguendo*, that plaintiffs had pleaded that this grant was  
24 backdated, the grant was made to Mohn and Nelson on their joining the board. They did not  
25 vote to approve the grant, nor did they have input as to when the grant would occur because  
26 they were not yet on the board. Plaintiffs plead no facts that would indicate that they knew the  
27 options had been backdated.

28

1 Plaintiffs next argue that Mohn and Nelson “ratified” backdated grants that occurred  
2 long before they were ever affiliated with CNET and, again, plaintiffs do not shed any light as  
3 to what “ratified” actually means. As with Currie, the idea might mean that they were complicit  
4 in granting them, or knew about them, or they failed to investigate on learning the information,  
5 or they failed to reveal the alleged backdating. That the Court has to guess as to Mohn and  
6 Nelson’s involvement shows that plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden to plead such facts  
7 with particularity.

8 Finally, plaintiffs argue that Mohn, Nelson, and Currie would have a substantial  
9 likelihood of personal liability because of their roles in the alleged backdating scheme. “[T]he  
10 mere threat of personal liability for approving a questioned transaction, standing alone, is  
11 insufficient to challenge either the independence or disinterestedness of directors . . . .”  
12 *Aronson*, 473 A.2d at 815. As with the other grounds that plaintiffs argue, plaintiffs have not  
13 pleaded with particularity why these facts give rise to more than a mere threat of personal  
14 liability for these three directors. None of them voted on the allegedly backdated grants. Even  
15 if judged under *Rales*, plaintiffs have not pleaded facts with particularity that would indicate  
16 that those three directors would be unable to exercise business judgment in responding to a  
17 shareholder demand. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to plead that Nelson, Currie or Mohn  
18 were not disinterested and independent.

19 **B. Service on the Compensation Committee.**

20 Colligan and Robison were on the board when allegedly backdated options were  
21 granted, and plaintiffs so plead. They also served on the compensation committee during their  
22 tenures at CNET. Plaintiffs allege that Colligan was a member from 1999 until 2006 and that  
23 Robison was a member from 2002 until 2003. Elsewhere in the complaint, however, plaintiffs  
24 allege that Robison, in his capacity as a compensation committee member, made decisions  
25 about Bonnie’s compensation in 2000 (Compl. ¶ 211). Then, regarding grants in 2001, Robison  
26 was again absent from the compensation committee, according to the pleading (Compl. ¶ 213).

27 Again, plaintiffs repeat the allegations that as board members, Colligan and Robison  
28 “ratified” the grants of backdated options. Again, the ratification idea is vague. Plaintiffs’

1 theory seems to be that backdating occurred, thus, the board members must have known about it  
2 and “ratified” it. As with the other directors, merely alleging that they ratified the grants as  
3 board members, without more, is not sufficient to plead with particularity that Colligan and  
4 Robison were not disinterested or independent or that their decisions were not the product of  
5 valid business judgment.

6 Pursuant to CNET’s 1994 stock options plan filed with the SEC, the board could  
7 delegate the authority to administer the plan to the compensation committee. The committee  
8 was to consist of two or more disinterested, independent directors of the board who had the  
9 authority to select grant dates for the options (Singerman Decl. Exh. A at 6). The committee  
10 could, however, delegate options-granting authority to executives of CNET. The chairman of  
11 the board, the president and vice presidents of the company could execute options on the  
12 committee’s behalf as long as the options complied with the provisions of the plan. It also  
13 stated that the options’ price was to be at or above the stock’s fair market value on the date of  
14 the grant. The options plan for 1997 contained similar language (CNET Req. Jud. Not. Exh. N).  
15 Thus, although it appears that the compensation committee was charged with administering the  
16 plan and deciding the numbers of options to be granted and the price of those options, other  
17 officers of the company could actually be responsible for executing the options. The  
18 compensation committee could delegate at least some of its options-granting authority. The  
19 compensation committee had a duty to administer the options plan, but they may not have made  
20 every single decision in granting options. Because of this, merely alleging that directors were  
21 members of the compensation committee does not demonstrate that they were not disinterested  
22 on these facts.

23 Plaintiffs have alleged that Colligan and Robison served on the compensation  
24 committee. Plaintiffs have also pleaded particularized facts that the options grants dated June 6,  
25 1998, April 17, 2000, and October 8, 2001 were backdated. Colligan served on the  
26 compensation committee for the final two grants, while Robison served on the committee for  
27 the grant dated April 17, 2000. In this capacity, they had the responsibility to oversee and  
28 administer the options plans.

1 “It is no answer to say that demand is necessary futile because . . . [the directors]  
2 approved the underlying transaction.” *Brehm v. Eisner*, 746 A.2d 244, 257 n.34 (Del. 2000).  
3 Here, plaintiffs make no allegations indicating that Colligan and Robison chose the date on  
4 which the allegedly backdated options were to be granted or that they knew the grant’s true  
5 date. Indeed, Colligan and Robison could have properly delegated the authority to execute  
6 these grants to some other officer at CNET. They may not have known the date on which all  
7 actions had been completed for the grants to be made. The discussion of accounting methods in  
8 this order admits of the possibility that the board members may not know the exact date on  
9 which a grant was finalized because the committee delegated that authority. Plaintiffs’  
10 allegations that because they were on the compensation committee, they must have known, do  
11 not constitute particularized facts.

12 Furthermore, the proxy statements on which plaintiffs so heavily rely state that  
13 compensation committee members “made decisions” regarding officer compensation (Compl.  
14 ¶ 211, 213). The proxy statements do not say what those decisions were or if they involved the  
15 dates on which the options were granted. This is not to say that plaintiffs must plead precisely  
16 what defendants knew about backdating at CNET and exactly when they knew it. That standard  
17 would be nearly impossible to meet at this stage. But where plaintiffs merely allege that  
18 approval was given without more, the facts pleaded simply do not support the inference that  
19 these two board members were not independent or disinterested or that their decisions were not  
20 protected by the business judgment rule.

21 CNET argues in response that it publicly stated in its restated financials that none of the  
22 officers or outside directors engaged in any wrongdoing. This included Colligan and Robison.  
23 Plaintiffs have not alleged that this statement was false, or that the amended 10K contained  
24 false statements. Plaintiffs would have the Court ignore this statement entirely, or assume that  
25 because something bad may have happened at CNET, that every statement by the company is to  
26 be distrusted in all respects. Plaintiffs are entitled to inferences in their favor at the pleading  
27 stage, however, those inferences must be reasonable. Plaintiffs are not entitled to pick and  
28

1 choose which of defendants' statements in public documents favor them and have all others  
2 ignored.

3 Here, plaintiffs have failed to plead with particularity that a majority of the board was  
4 not disinterested or independent or did not exercise business judgment in making decisions  
5 under *Aronson*. Similarly, if analyzed under *Rales*, and the board did not make a decision,  
6 plaintiffs have not pleaded facts that would give rise to the inference that the board could not  
7 have exercised business judgment when faced with a demand. Accordingly, nominal defendant  
8 CNET's motion to dismiss for failure to plead demand futility is **GRANTED**. Plaintiffs' claims  
9 are **DISMISSED**. Because of this, this order does not reach the merits of the individual  
10 defendants' motions to dismiss.

11 **C. Demand and Section 14(a).**

12 Plaintiffs argue that no demand is necessary to bring a claim under Section 14(a), and  
13 that they may proceed with this claim whether or not demand is excused as futile. The  
14 Ninth Circuit has not addressed this question. Plaintiff cites a single case in support of its  
15 contention. In *Vides v. Amelio*, 265 F. Supp. 2d 273, 275–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), the district court  
16 held that demand was not required to bring a Section 14(a) claim. Several district courts,  
17 including courts from the same district as *Vides*, have dismissed claims under Section 14(a) for  
18 failure to make a demand on the board. See, e.g., *In re IAC/Interactive Secur. Litig.*, \_\_\_ F.  
19 Supp. 2d \_\_\_, 2007 WL 853021, \*28 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 2006); *St. Clair Shores Gen.*  
20 *Employees Retirement Sys. v. Eibeler*, 2006 WL 2849783, at \*4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 4, 2006); *In re*  
21 *Trump Hotels S'holder Deriv. Litig.*, 2000 WL 1371317, at \*10 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The  
22 weight of the authority supports requiring plaintiffs to make a demand or plead that demand was  
23 futile in alleging a claim under Section 14(a). Furthermore, this view comports with the logic  
24 of the demand requirement itself. If a shareholder wishes to bring a lawsuit on the corporation's  
25 behalf, the shareholder should have to plead that the board could not have made a disinterested  
26 and independent decision to do so itself before proceeding. Accordingly, plaintiff must plead  
27 that demand was futile to bring a claim under Section 14(a). They failed to do so, thus, this  
28 claim will be **DISMISSED** as well.

